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Note: Bolt and burr (Exh. "C") are inserted through
Exh. "B" (sleeve) and through side of baler, anchoring sleeve
to baler. Washers are placed next to burr. Washers are larger
than sleeve, thereby allowing Exh. "A" (lever) to rotate
freely over the bushing without coming off.
(See Exh. "I", Owner's Manual, for more complete picture of baler without lever assembly.)
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In the Supreme Court
of the State of U tab

AUSTIN F. WINCHESTER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 8219

-vs.-

.EGAN FARM SERVICE, INC.

Defendant-Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

FACTS OF THE CASE
The appellant, Austin F. Winchester, hereinafter referred
to as the plaintiff, lives at Mountain Green, Morgan County,
Utah. He operates a farm and does considerable amounts of
custom farm work or neighbors and customers in Weber,
Davis and Morgan Counties. This work primarily consists of
combining grain, land moving and leveling, and hay baling.
5
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The respondent, Egan Farm Service, Inc., hereinafter referred
to as the defendant, is a retail sales organization located at
Ogden, Utah. It sells, services and assembles farm equipment.
On or about September 18, 1951, plaintiff purchased a
new "Long 50" baler from the defendant, who delivered the
same to plaintiff's farm at Mountain Green. The baler was
manufactured by Long Manufacturing Company of Tarboro,
North Carolina. Upon receiving the baler at its place of business at Ogden, Egan Farm Service attached a lever assembly
mechanism to the front part of the baler. ( T r. 4) This lever
mechanism extends forward from the front of the baler so
that the baler operator, who sits on a tractor to which the
baler is hitched, can manually put the baler in or out of operation by adjusting the position of the lever. It reaches from the
front of the baler to the right side of the operator as he sits
on the tractor, the end of the lever being about even with, and
about nine inches to the right of, the operator's hip. (Tr. 8~)
To illustrate the principals involved in this appeal and
to more clearly inform the Court of the operation of the lever
mechanism, a diagram is found at page 3. The diagram
generally illustrates the lever mechanism in operating and
non-operating positions.
Attached to the lever mechanism is a rod which extends
farther back to other parts of the hay baler. When the lever
is placed in upright position No. 1, it pushes against the rod,
causing the rod to press an idler pulley against the belt drive
of the baler. This causes the baler to engage and operate. On
the other hand, when the lever is pulled downward into position No. 2, it pulls on the rod, thus disengaging the idler
pulley from the belt and causing the baler to cease operating. The baler motor still runs, however. On pulling the lever

6
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into down pos1t1on, tension in created upon the lever by a
spring attached to the idler pulley. This spring is about one
inch in diameter. During the operation of the baler the lever
is in an upward position 90 per cent or more of the time
(Tr. 100); it is only when the baler operation is disengaged,
with the motor running, that the lever is in the down position.
After purchasing the baler in the fall of 1951, plaintiff
baled approximately 1,000 bales of custom hay and about 300
bales of his own hay-about two days of operation doing
the loose ends of the summer harvest-and then put the baler
in a shed for the winter. (Tr. 39) On or about May 25, 1952,
he took the machine from the shed and took it to an area at
the mouth of Weber Canyon for the purpose of baling hay
for customers. He baled hay for about two weeks prior to
June 16, 1952, at which time he suffered the injuries giving
rise to the lawsuit.
On June 16, 1952, while operating the baler in a field on
a farm at South Weber, Davis County, plaintiff completed
baling one piece of hay and took the baler from that field
to another. Upon completion the first field of hay, he left
the motor running and disengaged the operation of the baler
by putting the lever in the down position. Upon arriving at
the second piece of hay, and after putting the machine in
position to bale and stopping his tractor, he turned to his
right on the tractor seat for the purpose of releasing the lever
from the down position and placing it in the upright position
so that he could commence baling. (Tr. 31-32) Before he
could place his hand on the lever, it suddenly disengaged, and
the extremity thereof struck him across the nose and eye.
(T r. 32) As a result, he suffered a broken nose and laceration
and other injuries of the right eye. His permanent injuries con7
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sist of a greatly enlarged pupil in his right eye which refuses
to expand or contract with variations of light intensity, necessitating the constant use of dark glasses. He also suffers general
disfigurement from his broken nose and unsightly disfigurement of his right eye. He sustained financial losses arising
from doctor care, hospitalization, drugs, medicine, transportation seeking treatment, and loss of earnings during the time
when he was unable to return to work.
In the short time he had operated the baler the lever
mechanism had never before disengaged without manual assistance, and, to his knowledge, it had never so disengaged
during the time prior to his injury that three other persons
had operated the baler for short intervals. (Tr. 34)
Plaintiff commenced an action against the defendant,
a n d joined Long Manufacturing Company a n d Dearborn
Motors Corporation, the successor in interest of Long Manufacturing Company. Being unable to secure personal jurisdiction
over the other two defendants, plaintiff proceeded against
Egan Farm Service, alleging as to the lever mechanism, that
it was "negligently and carelessly attached to the . . . baler,
... and contained attachment parts which were weak, defective and insufficient in size and strength ... " (R. 001). Most
of the other allegations concerning the nature of the baler
and its defects were inapplicable to the defendant.
At the trial, plaintiff contended that the base of the lever,
at the point where it was attached to the baler chamber by
means of a bushing (Exhibit "B") and a bolt, burr and washer
(Exhibit "C"), actually did not in fact contain a bushing.
Furthermore, plaintiff contended that defendant inserted a
5/16 inch bolt (Exhibit "E") through the bushing area instead of the 3/8 inch bolt which was required for proper
8
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assembling. He contended that the failure to use a bushing
and the insertion of the smaller bolt permitted the lever
mechanism to slide upward sufficiently so as to allow the
lever pin to slip past the catch which was anchored to the
baler, thereby causing the lever to fly loose, inflicting the
injuries complained of.
After plaintiff put on his case and rested, defendant
moved the Court for a dismissal and a directed verdict upon
three separate grounds. The grounds generally asserted were
those of ( 1) failing to establish negligence, ( 2) contributory
negligence and ( 3) assumption of risk. After argument upon
the matter, the Court granted the motion and directed a verdict against plaintiff. AI though the court did not particularize
in writing, it felt that plaintiff's case failed for the reason
that he had assumed the risk of the defect which caused the
injury complained of. The court subsequently denied plaintiff's motion for a new trial.

STATEMENT OF POINTS TO BE RELIED UPON
BY PLAINTIFF ON APPEAL
POINT 1. The court erred in dismissing the action and
in granting a directed verdict in favor of defendant at the
conclusion of plaintiff's case.
(A) The evidence tended to prove negligence on the
part of the defendant in assembling the baler.
(B) The uncontradicted evidence introduced in behalf of plaintiff did not prove that the accident was
caused, as a matter of law, by reason of his sole negligence; nor did the same prove, as a matter of law, that
he was guilty of contributory negligence proximately
causing his injuries.
9
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(C) The uncontradicted evidence introduced in behalf of plaintiff did not prove, as a matter of_la:W~ t~at
he assumed the particular risk from which hts 111Junes
occurred.
ARGUMENT

(A)
The evidence tended to prove negligence on the part
the defendant in assembling the baler.

of

Although plaintiff, in its motion for dismissal and a directed verdict, assigned the foregoing point as one of its
grounds, the Court was not concerned with its position. Nevertheless, since the written record is silent, plaintiff will point
out sufficient evidentiary facts justifying submission of the
case to the jury from the standpoint of establishing causation
and proving negligence on the part of the defendant in assembling the baler.
The testimony of Merlin Egan, president of the defendant,
established the fact that a 3/8 inch bolt was required for
properly assembling the lever mechanism to the baler chamber
(Tr. 5). The bolt was inserted through the sleeve (Exhibit
"B") so as to anchor the sleeve tightly to the baler when constructed as required (Tr. 10). Before the bolt was burred
against the sleeve, the end of the lever was placed over it and
washers larger in size than the sleeve were inserted against the
sleeve, thus allowing the lever to rotate freely without coming
off.
Plaintiff contended that the lever mechanism was defectively assembled in two respects, both or either of which
10
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could have caused the lever to uncatch and strike him as indicated.
( 1) Defendant did not install the required bushing; and
( 2) An undersized bolt of improper length was used to
anchor the sleeve to the baler.
Further testifying under Rule 43 (b), U.R.C.P., Merlin
Egan admitted that if a 3/8 inch bolt was put through a halfinch sleeve (spacer) (Exhibit "B"), such as was being used
for illustrative purposes-and which actually was removed
from an identical baler belonging to Leslie Olsen at Eden,
Utah (Tr. 22)-the assembly "wouldn't be right" (Tr. 12).
It logically follows from Mr. Egan's testimony that the defendant would be negligent in attaching the lever mechanism
with an undersized bolt or without a sleeve (also referred
to during the trial as a "bushing" or "spacer").

ji(

Th\

Plaintiff took the stand and testified that the lever pin
(Tr. 48) fit into the anchor-plate catch 3/8 of an inch deep;
he further testified that he observed up and down play in
the lever mechanism, amounting to possibly 3/8 of an inch
free travel (Tr. 49). This discovery, made when he examined
the lever after being released from the hospital, caused him to
disassemble the lever mechanism. The existence of free play
would allow the lever to raise and slip out of the anchor-plate
catch, particularly since the lever was subjected to considerable
pulling tension on the part of a large spring (Tr. 48, 49).
In fact, plaintiff submits that it would not necessarily be vital
that the exact amount of free play be proven for the simple
reason that any amount of play in the assembly could allow
11
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for a gradual wearing against the anchor-plate catch, the net
result being that the abnormal wear would eventually permit
the lever pin to slip past its catch. This is a logical conclusion
to be taken in view of the testimony of Merlin Egan, supra,
and from the common experience of mankind.
Plaintiff submits that, as the trial would have progressed
in its logical order, he would have brought out evidence that
Egan Farm Service, Inc., improperly assembled the lever
mechanism on nearly every long "50" baler which it sold and
assembled to the minimum point of showing that 3/8 inch
bolts were inserted into 1/2 inch bushings (Tr. 12, 22, 24);
and that this defect could have been remedied by drilling
the baler chamber to 1/2 inch in size and inserting a 1/2
inch bolt.
Of course, plaintiff contends that his baler was much more
carelessly assembled than just indicated. Plaintiff introduced
the bolt which he took from his baler after the accident
(Exhibit "E"-Tr. 45), and further testified that no bushing
was present. The bolt was 5/16 inch in size, smaller than the
3/8 inch bolt which defendant believed and stated to be the
required size.
Plaintiff refers to the recent Utah cases of Hooper v.
General Motors Corp. (Utah, 1953), 260 P2 549, and Northern v. General Motors Corp. (Utah, 1954), 268 P2 981. In
Hooper v. General Motors Corp., a suit against the assembler
of a truck for damages sustained when a recently purchased
truck overturned allegedly because the left rear wheel failed
due to separation of its component parts, held, in reversing
a directed verdict in favor of defendant that:
12
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" . . . the assembler of an automobile, who purchases wheels from a manufacturer, is liable to one who
purchases a car from a retailer for an injury caused by
the collapse of a wheel because of defects which would
have been discoverable by reasonable testing or inspection. McPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382,
111 N. E. 1050, L. R. A. 1916F 696."
It is submitted that the defendant could easily have seen
and detected the defects complained of in this lawsuit for the
reason that it assembled that particular part of the baler.

Further continuing with the rules laid down in the Hooper
case with respect to the sufficiency of the evidence to go to
the jury, the Court stated:
"Contrary to the instruction as given, the undisputed
fact of post accident rim-spider separation may be
( 1) some evidence of a defective wheel at the time of
automobile assembly and, (2) some evidence of accident causation."
The Court pointed out that the separated condition of the
spider and rim of the wheel after the accident was some evidence of a defective assembly. The further fact that the car
had only gone 6, 700 miles with no prior damage ( cf: this
baler used but slightly more than two weeks) was a significant factor in the Court's reversal.
The reasoning and the rules laid down in the Hooper
v. General Motors Corp. case were cited with approval in
the Northern v. General Motors Corp. case. Suffice it to say
that both cases are strong authorities for plaintiff's position
in this action and, because of their recent nature, the writer
feels that the Court is not in need of extensive argument as
to their effect and meaning.
13
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Plaintiff submits that defendant's negligence and the question of causation were sufficiently established to present a
jury question.

(B)
The uncontradicted evidence introduced in behalf of
plaintiff did not prove that the accident was caused, as a matter
of law, by reason of his sole negligence; nor did the same prove,
as a matter of law, that he was guilty of contributory negligence
proximately causing his injuries.

If the Court agrees that there was sufficient evidence
to go to the jury on the question of causation, the first of the
points just raised: namely, that of sole negligence, has been
sufficiently answered. Consequently, this discussion will concern itself solely with the question of whether plaintiff was
contributorily negligent in sustaining the injuries complained of.
Although defendant raised the matters of contributory
negligence and assumption of risk in its motion for dismissal
and for directed verdict, there is very little distinction between
the two defenses in most cases. In fact, the Restatement of
Torts has combined the two into one defense. However, since
the points were separately raised, this discussion will be divided
into two parts, each part referring primarily to its particular
heading.
Prosser on Torts, Chapter 9 at page 379, points out the
main distinction between the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk:
14
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" . . . In working out the distinction, the courts
have arrived at the conclusion that assumption of risk
is a matter of knowledge of the danger and intelligent
acquiesence in it, and that to the extent that this can
be found recovery will be denied; while contributory
negligence is a matter of some fault or departure from
the standard of reasonable conduct however unwilling
or protesting the plaintiff may be. The two may co-exist,
or either may exist without the other."
This discussion of contributory negligence will primarily
relate to what constitutes reasonable conduct under the circumstances of this case.
The precise question before this Court on the issue of
contributory negligence is whether plaintiff, in reaching for
the lever and in getting the side of his face in such a position
that it received a glancing blow from the lever, was guilty of
such unreasonable conduct under the circumstances that no
jury question was presented. Defendant will undoubtedly
maintain that plaintiff knew the lever was subject to considerable tension created by the spring, and that he knew that if
the lever became disengaged, he would possibly sustain injury
if he was in a position to be struck by it.
In answer to such an argument-which seemed to impress
the trial judge-the writer wishes to point out that most
levers are subject to spring tension of one type or other. In
fact, if there were no tension against levers, there would be
nothing to cause their locking devices to stay in place and no
purpose for their existence. These are merely elementary
rules of mechanical engineering and physics.
We must next ask ourselves if plaintiff's conduct was
unreasonable, considering all possible inferences in his favor,

15
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in turning to his right to grab the lever and in getting his
face into a position where it might be struck. Such might be
the case if plaintiff had reason to believe that the lever might fly
loose, but we must consider that the baler and lever mechanism
were constructed so that the lever would reach forward to the
tractor operator. From his position on the tractor the lever
was always available for use (see diagram). Furthermore, the
Owner's Manual (Exhibit "I", p. 2) clearly stated that the
baler "has been soundly engineered and thoroughly tested to
give you the best automatic pick-up hay baler that you can
buy." Consequently, we face the fact that it was intended
that the lever be in a position near the body of the operator
and that it should not constitute a booby-trap.
Plaintiff's evidence was that the operator of a baler is
required to turn to his right for the purpose of reaching for
the lever and for watching the pick-up assembly and other
parts of the baler as the hay feeds into the baler during its
operation (Tr. 87, 103). The operator of a hay baler never
looks straight ahead of the tractor while baling; he must
always look ahead out of the corner of his left eye, so to speak,
and watch the baler pick-up (and other parts of the baler)
as it follows the windrow with his right eye, with his face
and body turned slightly to the right. The net result is that
one's body and face are in position above the lever when in
the downward position.
Of course, the lever would be in an upward pos1t10n
during operation, but its location and the operator's habit
of turning to the right upon stopping so as to view the baler
or to grab the lever when in the down position could certainly

16
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be anticipated by the manufacturer as a normal course of conduct. In fact, the writer has operated farm machinery all
of his life and has encountered levers on every type of
machine. True, they are designed to hold tension, but they are
widely regarded as harmless items. Furthermore, many farm
machines other than balers have levers located in close proximity to the operator's body. That is where they have to be.
Mere knowledge that a lever is subjected to spring tension
surely cannot charge plaintiff with contributory negligence
when a defect in assembly released the tension. Nevertheless,
even assuming plaintiff's standard of care fell below that of a
reasonable man as to the "spring tension" risk, he is not barred
from recovering since he was not negligent as to the "defective
assembly" risk caused by "free-play" in the lever assembly.
Prosser on Torts at page 393, in commenting on this proposition from a contributory negligence standpoint, says:
"Such conduct will bar recovery only if it has exposed the plaintiff to the particular risk from which he
suffers harm.'' (Italics added.)
Further quoting from page 396:
"The accepted view now is that the plaintiff's failure
to exercise reasonable care for his own safety does
not bar his recovery unless his injury results from the
risk to which his conduct has exposed him. In a leading
Connecticut case, in which a workman violated instructions riot to work on the unguarded end of a slippery
platform and was injured by the fall of a brick wall,
it was held that he might recover, since his negligence
did not extend to such a risk."
Plaintiff submits that the defects in assembly caused and
17
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permitted the tension to pull the lever pin out of its catch, thus
releasing it with great force.
Quoting from 38 Am. Jur., Negligence, Par. 177, page
853, the rule is further explained:
" ... Therefore, there can be no contributory negligence unless the defendant is guilty of negligence having a direct and proximate causal relation to the injury.
This observation is important, especially from the
standpoint of the burden of proof, and in the direction
of a verdict for failure to sustain the burden of proof."
Quoting further from the same source at Par. 182, page
859:
"Exposure of known danger, however, is not always
contributory negligence. It constitutes contributory
negligence only where it is voluntary and unnecessary
exposure to a dangerous instrumentality or condition,
the peril of which is appreciated by the plaintiff. Even
the most prudent man is sometimes compelled to take
risks; at least some risk is apparent in the ordinary
activities of life ... Men may properly and lawfully
do work that is essentially dangerous in its nature,
and a person engaged in the performance of such work
may know that it is dangerous, and yet not be guilty
of contributory negligence in the performance thereof,
unless he voluntarily and unnecessarily exposes himself to the danger."
And from Par. 184 at page 861:
"An essential element of contributory negligence is
that the person to be charged therewith knew, or by
the exercise of ordinary care should have known, of
the circumstances or condition out of which the danger
arose."
18
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''"

Also from Par. 190 at pages 866, 868:
"Contributory. negligence is not imputable to a plaintiff for failing to look out for a danger for which he
had no reasonable cause to apprehend, ... One without
special knowledge of all the elements of dangef incident to a particular situation is not to be charged with
contributory negligence if he exercised reasonable care
so far as things appear to him ... "
The Restatement of Torts cites two examples at Section
468 to illustrate the rules just set forth:
"1. The X Company uses a public alley as a place
in which to load and unload its trucks. The company
warns A that the alley is dangerous and orders him
to keep out. Notwithstanding this warning, A enters the
alley. A siding maintained by the company ends on a
bank immediately above the alley. Due to the defective
condition of the siding a coal car is precipated into the
alley striking A. A is not barred from recovery by his
consciously subjecting himself to the risk of being run
down by the company's trucks.
2. A while working as a mason in the repair of B's
wall is warned by his foreman not to use a certain
scaffold because there is no guard rail about it. While
so working on the scaffold, a part of the wall, which
through the negligence of B is in bad repair, falls. It
strikes A and injures him. A is not barred from recovery
against B although he might be barred had his injury
resulted solely from his falling from the scaffold."

The defendant might come back and try to avoid the
general rule by saying that no injury would have been caused
by the defective assembly were it not for the action of the
spring tension of which plaintiff was aware. Again Prosser
on Torts at page 397 provides the answer:
19
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" ... Such cases frequently say that the_ plaintiff's
negligence is not the 'proximate cause' of hts damage.
It is, of course, quite possible that his conduct may
not have been a substantial contributing factor at all,
where the harm would have occurred even if he had
exercised proper care. But in the usual case the casual
connection is clear and beyond dispute, and no problem
of causation is involved. What is meant is that the
plaintiff's conduct has not exposed him to any foreseeable risk of the particular injury through the defendant's
negligence, and therefore is not available as a defense."
In the Utah case of Glenn v. Gibbons and Reed Co.
(1954), 265 P2 1013, plaintiff secured a jury verdict for
damages to a large shovel which was being used to load gravel
in a gravel pit. During the course of operations a large bank
of gravel broke loose and descended upon the shovel, causing
it to be damaged. The defendant raised the defense that
plaintiff was contributorily negligent and, after the jury verdict, a motion for directed verdict was granted against plaintiff.
In reversing the trial court's decision and in reinstating the
jury verdict, the Utah Supreme Court made the following observation:
''The third basis for the motion for the directed
verdict was that plaintiff was contributorily negligent
as a matter of law. When the plaintiff viewed the pit,
he became alarmed that his shovel was in a position
of danger and when the operator refused to remove
the shovel without direction from Newman, plaintiff
did nothing further to extricate his property from the
peril. Apparently defendant contends that plaintiff was
under a duty to seize the shovel which was then under
the control of his bailee, and drive it out of the pit
himself. Plaintiff had no knowledge of the probable
presence of water and wet clay at the base of the gravel
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and no knowledge of blasting to be performed that
night; his protest was based simply on the height of
the face. Had he known all of the facts, he may have
been held to a higher degree of care. Knox v. Snow,
(Utah) 229 P2 874. Too, more than one inference
can be here drawn as to what a feasonably prudent man
would do under the particular circumstances, which
makes the question of contributory negligence one for
the jury. Baker v. Decker, 117 Utah 15, 212 P2 679."
(Italics added.)
Plaintiff submits that the foregoing case is entirely in
point with the case now before the Court. In that case, plaintiff
realized that there was a potential danger from the face of
the gravel pit, but did not realize or understand that there
was the presence of water and wet clay at the gravel or that
there would be blasting performed that night; similarly, this
plaintiff knew that there was spring tension on the lever, but
he also knew that such levers would stay in place. What he
did not know was that there was a defective assembly which
would allow the spring tension to release. Had plaintiff known
all of the facts, he certainly would have been held to a higher
degree of care than was exercised. Consequently, he should
not be charged with contributory negligence.
The case of Glenn v. Gibbons and Reed Co. refers to another interesting point which will undoubtedly be raised by
defendant. In the foregoing quotation, it was pointed out
that plaintiff became alarmed "that his shovel was in a position
of danger . . . " In this case, defendant will undoubtedly
refer to plaintiff's testimony (Tr. 57) that the lever did not appear to be working properly. However, plaintiff further testified
(Tr. 50, 63, 68) that there was nothing about the lever which
21
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caused him to fear it. He stated that he did not like the position
of the lever and that it showed evidence of a poor design and
that it was generally unhandy and in the way (Tr. 68) · He
further testified that in the upright position (Tr. 95) the lever
did not operate properly in that it did not cause sufficient
tension to be applied against the belt pulley, thus allowing
the belt to slip off occasionally. However, the lever itself had
never before slipped out of its catch in either the upright or
in the down position. In any event, the Court should not lose
sight of the fact that an entirely different set of mechanical
principles took effect upon the lever and the source of its
tension while in the upright position from those working on the
lever and the source of its tension while in the down position.
Since the lever had never previously disengaged while in the
down position, he had no prior notice of the defect complained
of. The only defect about the lever which plaintiff noticed
related to its inability to tighten the belt while in the upright
position, and, as to this, he testified that, in his opinion at
the time it was first discovered, it couldn't be remedied (Tr. 57).
It is also expected that defendant will take the position

that plaintiff knew, or should have known, of the precise defect
i.e.; improper assembly, which caused his injury. In support
of this position, defendant will undoubtedly contend that the
bolt which was inserted through the sleeve and baler chamber
was approximately 3/4 inch longer than the bolt ordinarily
required. Defendant might further contend that plaintiff's version of the manner in which the lever was assembled would
not possibly allow it to work.
In answer to the first contention as to the excessive length
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of t~e bolt which was used, necessitating the addition of
several washers, plaintiff testified (Tr. 94) that this particular
bolt was basically hidden from view by another lever on the
side of the baler (see diagram and Exhibit "I") and that the
operation of a hay baler caused considerable accumulations
of dust and hay leaves on all exposed areas (Tr. 94). Furthermore, it is a matter of common knowledge that one who purchases a piece of new machinery can hardly be expected to
know whether each precise part of the mechanism has been
proper! y engineered, assembled and constructed.

~·r

On cross-examining plaintiff defendant attempted to
show, by means of illustration with the parts before the court,
that the lever could not be put into the upright position
without the presence of a bushing. So that this Court will not
be misled (Tr. 92) plaintiff wishes to point out that the illustration used in the lower court would not allow the lever to
move into the upright position for two reasons: (1) Exhibit
"D", which was used to represent the side of a baler, had a
welded projection of about 1/8 inch which prevented the
lever from sliding during the court demonstration (Tr. 109,
110), and ( 2) the manner of the demonstration caused the
bolt to be cinched tightly against the baler.
If the Court will carefully examine Exhibit "E" (the
bolt which plaintiff took from the lever assembly), it will notice
that the burr was originally cinched against the end of the
threads as tightly as possible. The groove is very pronounced.
In fact, the burr was secured so tightly against the end of
the threads that it caused the bolt to crystallize and break
when removed. Consequently, with just enough washers to
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allow the burr to secure the washers against the lever without
inserting the required bushing-but yet not so tight as to cause
a bind-the use of an undersized bolt and the absence of a
bushing would still permit the lever to work, from all outward appearances, in much the same manner that it would
have normally worked had it actually had the required bushing.
If the Court further considers that the entire lever mechanism
was subject to pulley-and-belt or spring tension, it can see
that the lever would still operate without giving the operator
of the baler actual notice that it was defective.
The defendant may place emphasis on the recent Utah
case of Scoffield v. Sprouse-Reitz Co. ( 1953), 265 P2 396,
which involved injuries to a salesman who fell over the side
of a stairway having no bannister while calling on the manager
of a defendant store. However, it is submitted that that case
does not apply to the facts of this case for the reason that
plaintiff there had "ample opportunity to observe and, as a
reasonably prudent man, should have looked to locate the
handrail before he attempted to put his weight on it." The
case at bar is entirely different and more nearly fits the rule
announced in the case of Glenn v. Gibbons and Reed Co.
There seems to be no question but what the issue of contributory negligence was clearly for the jury. An issue was
presented which by all standards could not be resolved against
plaintiff in view of the rule accepted in the Sprouse-Reitz Co.
case that all reasonable inferences should be resolved in his
favor.
The case of Heckel v. Ford Motor Co. (New Jersey)
13-8 Atl. 242, involved a situation wherein a rapidly turning
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tractor pulley burst loose, striking plaintiff who was in the
path of the flying parts. In pointing out that the case hinged
on the issue of whether there was a defect in the pulley,
the court said:
"As before stated, it was for the jury to determine
whether or not there was a defect in the pulley; whether
or not the pulley did break or burst because of such
defect; and whether the bursting so caused was the
proximate cause of injury to the respondent."
The interesting part of that case lies in that no issue was
raised that plaintiff was contributorily negligent or assumed
any risk in getting in the path of the pulley parts. That plaintiff
knew that the pulley was rotating rapidly under great centrifugal force and that if it disintegrated it would injure him.
But he also knew that a piece of equipment properly manufactured and assembled does not break loose in such manner.

11

'l

rw
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Quoting from 38 Am. Jur. Par. 188 at page 865, it is
stated:
" . . . a question of contributory negligence does
not become one of law for the court to decide solely
for the reason that there is no evidence directly to the
effect that the plaintiff appreciated the peril. In other
words, it is for the jury to determine whether knowledge of the physical characteristics of the offending
instrumentality constituted a sufficient warning of peril
to the plaintiff."

(C)
The uncontradicted evidence introduced tn behalf of
plaintiff did not prove, as .a matter of law, that he assumed
the particular risk from which his injuries occurred.
25
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Prosser on Torts at page 376 outlines the elements of
the defense of assumption of risk:
"The defense of assumption of risk rests upon th~
plaintiffs consent to relieve the defendant o~ an obhgation of conduct toward him, and to take h1s chances
of harm from a particular risk."
The discussion set forth in the preceding section relating
to contributory negligence contains the essential arguments
which plaintiff contends will remove him from the category
of one who has assumed the risk of the defective baler assembly. Plaintiff has previously pointed out that he had no
knowledge of the particular risk from which his injuries
occurred; consequently, it is impossible to construe any consent
on his part to accept the same.
Not only must plaintiff have had actual or constructive
knowledge of the risk involved, but he must have voluntarily
made the choice of encountering the risk notwithstanding the
peril incident to it. There can be no choice unless the person
is aware of the precise risk.
All of the cases are emphatic in stating that the risk must
not only be known, but that the dangers arising from it must
be appreciated. Plaintiff submits that had he known of the
defects in the assembly of the lever, he would certainly have
appreciated the danger involved and would have exercised
his "freedom of choice" by repairing the lever, thereby eliminating the risk itself.
Plaintiff may refer to the case of Wold v. Ogden City
(Utah, 1953), 258 P2 453. That case involved an action
against Ogden City and a construction company for injuries
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sustained when plaintiff fell into a ditch which had been dug
in the street in front of his home. On appeal from a motion
dismissing the action, this Supreme Court held that, under the
circumstances of the case, plaintiff had been contributorily
negligent and had assumed a known risk, and, therefore, was
precluded as a matter of law from recovering against either
defendant.
The Wold case is entirely dissimilar from the case at bar
for the simple reason that the plaintiff in that case actually
saw the hazard with his own eyes and "looked this situation
over." Notwithstanding the dangers apparent to him, the
plaintiff in that case attempted to cross a trench at 2: 30
in the morning in an "extremely dark area, no lights, and
in the middle of the night and in the shade of the trees." In
its decision the Supreme Court quoted extensively from Prosser
on Torts, quoting directly that "the plaintiff cannot be heard
to say that he did not comprehend a risk which must have been
obvious to him." The court further acquiesced with Dean
Prosser that in the usual case, the plaintiff's "knowledge and
appreciation of the danger will be a question for the jury;
but where it is clear that any person of normal intelligence
in his position must have understood the danger, the issue
must be decided by the court."
It was further pointed out in the Wold case that plaintiff
had an easy alternate route to follow which would not have
submitted him to the dangers of a trench cave-in in the middle
of the night. Plaintiff believes the facts of the Wold case have
no similarity to the case before this Court, although the law
set forth therein is sound.
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CONCLUSION
Plaintiff submits that none of the defenses raised by defendant in its motion for dismissal and for directed verdict,
viewed in light of the evidence, justified the lower court in
taking the case from the jury as it did. The evidence supporting
causation and negligence on the part of defendant is strong
and, as to the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk, it can easily be seen that the defendant did not
know, and reasonably could not have been expected to know,
of the particular hazard and risk which caused his injury.
Unless plaintiff can be charged with having such knowledge,
the case should have gone to the jury.
Plaintiff requests that this Court reverse the ruling of
the District Court of the Second Judicial District in granting
defendant's motion for dismissal and for directed verdict and
in denying plaintiff's motion for new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
GLEN E. FULLER and
JOSEPH Y. LARSEN, JR.

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
32 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah
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